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they are affected by macroeconomic policies. However, research to date has offered no con-
sistent conclusions on the relationship between political costs and earnings management
in China. This study tests whether real estate ﬁrms attempt to decrease earnings during
periods of macroeconomic control, using variables related to the national real estate mar-
ket as proxies for political costs. We ﬁnd that political costs are negatively related to earn-
ings management in listed real estate ﬁrms. In addition, we ﬁnd that non-state-owned
enterprises utilized more income-decreasing accruals during this period. Our results are
consistent with the political costs hypothesis.
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University of Hong Kong. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The political costs hypothesis of earnings management, which is one of three basic hypotheses of positive accounting
theory, has long been an important issue in positive accounting research (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). However, prior
research has mainly focused on mature Western market economies (e.g., Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981; Daley and
Vigeland, 1983; McKee et al., 1984; El-Gazzar et al., 1986; Boynton et al., 1992; Han and Wang, 1998; Monem, 2003).
The existing research on transition and emerging economies is limited. For instance, there has been relatively little research
on China and prior studies have not been able to draw uniform conclusions (e.g., Wang, 2000; Wu et al., 2004; Liu and Jing,
2005; Liu et al., 2005; Zhang, 2008). In addition, there are huge political and economic differences in the institutional
backgrounds of mature and emerging markets. These differences are clearly observable between China and most Western
countries. Accordingly, the motivation for this study is to explore whether the political costs hypothesis of earnings
management differs between emerging and mature markets.
This study aims to address the following questions. Is the political costs hypothesis applicable to China? Do listed com-
panies in China face different political costs compared to listed companies in Western countries? Which variables bestnal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.
served.
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manipulate earnings?
This study examines a sample of real estate ﬁrms in China. The real estate industry is highly capital intensive and its
health is vital to national well-being and people’s livelihoods in general. The development and stability of the real estate
market can greatly affect macroeconomic operations and social stability (Huang et al., 2009). Accordingly, the Chinese gov-
ernment has shown interest in regulating the development of the domestic real estate market. Nation-wide real estate devel-
opment boomed in 2001 placing huge upward pressure on prices and led to strong growth of the real estate industry in
China. This growth generated huge proﬁts for real estate businesses. However, excessive development distorted the alloca-
tion of resources to such a degree that it threatened the health of China’s macroeconomic operations. Since 2003, the Chinese
government has promulgated a series of policy documents on the macroeconomic regulation of the real estate industry.
Overall, the government’s aim is to use various policy tools to control real estate prices to achieve a more reasonable price
level. To avoid being subject to more stringent regulations and public scrutiny, real estate companies are likely to adopt earn-
ings decreasing accounting policies. Thus, the rapid development of China’s real estate market and the subsequent regulatory
changes provide an excellent research and experimental setting in which to examine the relationship between political costs
and corporate earnings management behavior in an emerging market.
Using data from listed real estate companies in China from 2002 to 2007, we conduct an empirical study to determine
whether the political costs hypothesis is applicable to China. The results show that, with the implementation of increasingly
tight macroeconomic controls, listed real estate companies adopted earnings decreasing accounting policies. In addition, be-
cause state-owned real estate companies have a different sensitivity to political costs, non-state-owned listed companies
have more incentive to adopt earnings decreasing accounting policies.
Our study makes several contributions to the literature on earnings management. First, we associate macro-level govern-
ment regulationwith themicro-level corporateuse of earningsmanagement in the economicdevelopmentof a transitionecon-
omy. We ﬁnd that macroeconomic controls can provide an incentive for earnings management, which is different from the
effects of political costs found inWestern countries. Second, due to the asymmetric effects of the samemacroeconomicpolicies,
different political cost sensitivities are found to exist between different types of companies. These ﬁndings enrich the political
costs hypothesis and our understanding of the impact of macroeconomic policies in the institutional setting of China.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review, theoretical analysis and
hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the sample, variables and the empirical results. The ﬁnal section concludes
the paper, outlines the limitations of our study and proposes future research directions.2. Literature review, theoretical analysis and hypothesis development
2.1. Literature review
There is a considerable body of research on political costs. Early research focused on the selection of political cost vari-
ables, such as the size of a company’s assets that are considered to be positively correlated with political costs. Watts and
Zimmerman (1978) found that, compared with small companies, large companies are more likely to accept GPLA (General
Price Level Adjusted) accounting standards, because proﬁts adjusted by the guidelines are lower than unadjusted proﬁts.
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) analyzed the reasons for this phenomenon and found that larger companies have a greater
motivation to hide proﬁts, because once proﬁts are considered to be derived from monopoly situations, the government
may institute wealth transfer policies. Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) conducted a number of empirical tests and found
that larger ﬁrms are more likely to use accounting policies that may lead to reduced proﬁts. McKee et al. (1984) later used
sales as an alternative variable for political costs and found similar results. Daley and Vigeland (1983) found that companies
with higher income tend to expense rather than capitalize research and development costs. Although Daley and Vigeland
(1983) analyzed a different political cost issue, unlike Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981), their results were only found in
small companies.
Corporate tax rates are also an important alternative measure of political costs. In this case, corporations that are free
from political involvement generally have lower tax rates. Alternatively, companies with higher proﬁts are more easily iden-
tiﬁed by governments and tend to have higher tax rates. Therefore, enterprises have motives to reduce their current proﬁts
to reduce the amount of tax payable. El-Gazzar et al. (1986) conducted a number of tests and found that companies with high
tax rates tend to capitalize their leases. Boynton et al. (1992) conducted an empirical study on the relationship between
earnings management and clauses of the US Tax Reform Act of 1986 and conﬁrmed the existence of earnings management
for tax avoidance. Han and Wang (1998) showed that during the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis, many US oil processing enterprises
adopted measures to reduce current proﬁts, such as changing accounting policies and reducing their closing inventory, to
avoid being liable for the windfall proﬁt tax as a result of the sharp rise in oil prices.
A limitation of most of the previous studies on political costs is that they do not focus on particular events (Wong, 1988).
However, the following studies on the relationship between political costs and earnings management do focus on speciﬁc
events, which are discussed with regard to their particular political background. For example, as some industries are more
likely to attract the attention of regulators, they have a greater motivation to decrease earnings to avoid regulation. Jones
(1991) investigated 23 companies inﬂuenced by the US International Trade Commission (ITC) scheme to restrict imports
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(1992) conducted a similar study of companies subject to antitrust investigations and also found that, during the
investigation, companies’ accruals were signiﬁcantly negative. Cahan et al. (1997) carried out a study of the US chemical
industry in late 1979, when companies were facing condemnation for environmental pollution. During the investigation per-
iod, when Congress discussed establishing a pollution clean-up draft fund (subsidized by the polluting companies) the re-
ported proﬁts of the polluting companies were signiﬁcantly lower. Han and Wang (1998) studied the accounting policies
used by oil companies during the 1990 Gulf crisis when oil prices were rising. They found that oil companies decreased their
earnings in 1990 through inventory and special accruals in the third and fourth quarters to reduce the high political costs
associated with this large abnormal growth in income. Monem (2003) studied the Australian gold mining industry. Prior
to 1991, Australia had implemented a tax-free policy for the gold mining industry. However, during a period of rapid eco-
nomic development in the early 1980s the gold mining industry generated very high proﬁts and the government came under
increasing public pressure to impose a tax on gold. Monem’s (2003) investigation began in 1985, after the government re-
leased a draft bill on the taxation of the gold industry. The draft was adopted in 1988, and implemented in 1991. Using the
Jones (1991) model, Monem (2003) found a signiﬁcant reduction in accruals in the Australian gold mining industry during
the 1985–1988 period. As the accruals were also signiﬁcantly lower than those of Canadian gold mining companies in the
same period, the ﬁndings support the political costs hypothesis.
The political costs hypothesis has been investigated in various countries over many years and has been widely veriﬁed.
However, as yet, there is little consensus on whether it is applicable to China. Some scholars believe that the political costs
hypothesis cannot be veriﬁed in China, because ﬁrm size has no signiﬁcant effect on the choice of accounting policy. Large
companies may have more robust ﬁnancial systems and greater supervision over ﬁnancial control, which may reduce their
ability to manipulate their accounting policies (Wang, 2000). Liu et al. (2005) analyzed the effects of macroeconomic control
mechanisms on listed companies from transitional markets in relation to voluntary changes in accounting policies. They
found that listed companies are more willing to smooth their income. On the other hand, Wu et al. (2004) and Liu and Jing
(2005) found that ﬁrm size is negatively related to big bath accounting. Zhang (2008) found that petrochemical companies
decreased their earnings because of political costs in 2005 and 2006 when oil prices were high.
2.2. Background
Prior studies generally agree with the theory of ‘‘political costs of proﬁt management’’ in Western contexts. However, the
circumstances are quite different in China, especially as it is not suitable to use ‘‘company size’’ as a proxy for ‘‘political costs’’
in this market. This raises a series of interesting problems with regard to why ‘‘company size’’ is not a suitable proxy and
which variables could serve as alternative measures.
To resolve this problem, it is necessary to understand the political and economic differences between China and the West.
The ﬁrst difference relates to the system of governance. In Western countries, political power belongs to the elected parlia-
ment. However, in China, power is distributed among many government departments (Li, 2005; Mao, 2007). Furthermore, as
emerging countries invariably have weak legal systems, political power is much more easily co-opted by large corporations
(Zingales, 2009). In emerging countries, settlement costs are much lower for large corporations, as a result of their imperfect
and inefﬁcient legal systems. In addition, the governments of emerging countries tend to be reliant on large corporations in
various ways, which may eventually eliminate their power of governance.
A second difference is political reasons for managing the economy. In the West, the main purposes are to avoid monop-
olies, protect the environment or increase tax revenues (Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981; Cahan et al., 1997; Han and Wang,
1998). In relation to industry, these aims are realized by regulating certain characteristics of large corporations. However, the
goal of emerging countries, such as China, is not to limit the scale of companies, but to encourage them to become stronger
and more competitive. This is clearly manifest in the Chinese government’s strategies of ‘‘big over small’’ and ‘‘become bigger
and stronger’’. Therefore, the development of large corporations is less restricted in China. Nonetheless, economic stability is
also very important for this emerging and transforming nation. For this reason, the government often pays closest attention
to ﬁrms in industries that have the greatest impact on the welfare of its citizens.
A third difference is the objective of the government’s economic management. There are few state-owned companies in
the West, but there are many large state-owned companies in China. These state-owned companies can earn some beneﬁts
from banks, such as ‘‘recessive guarantees’’ (Brandt and Li, 2003; Sun et al., 2006; Lu et al., 2009), because they are following
the government’s requirement for diversiﬁcation. Therefore, it is unlikely that state authorities in China will control the size
of a company. If there is such a possibility, the company will be non-state-owned. For example, when monetary policy is
tightened, state-owned companies’ requests for loans will be satisﬁed before those from non-state companies. Thus, non-
state-owned companies are affected by government economic management more than state-owned companies.
The last difference concerns the form of economic management. It is signiﬁcant that the Chinese economy started from a
planned economy. Thus, the government is used to implementing industrial policies. When a company’s development
matches the government’s industrial policies, it will be encouraged. Otherwise, it will be strictly limited.
In summary, China is an emerging country in the process of economic transition. The political costs of companies in China
are quite different from those faced by companies in Western countries. These differences are reﬂected in many aspects of
the system of government, such as the motivation for governing, the form of government and the different circumstances
that are subject to economic control.
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are strongly affected by macroeconomic control policies. Furthermore, real estate is central to the national economy and
people’s livelihoods. Thus, the real estate industry provides an excellent research and experimental setting for testing the
relationship between earnings management behavior and political costs in an emerging market.
During the last 30 years of reforms to China’s economy, the Chinese real estate industry has evolved and developed from a
state of depression to a booming industry. With the development of the real estate market, real estate has become China’s
most important and largest industry. In addition to the essential productive factors relating to real estate development, the
real estate market has become an important investment target for families and companies. With the increase in the scale of
the real estate market, its development and change now affect not only ﬁnancial security and social stability, but also the
health of the entire national economy.
Considering the importance of the real estate industry to people’s lives, a jump or slump in house prices may create social
and economic turmoil. Therefore, another priority for the government has been to determine how to control and manage the
development of the real estate market. According to rule no. 30 of the ‘‘Price Law of the PRC’’ issued in 1997, the State Council
and local governments have the right to restrict the prices of essential commodities and services, when prices appear to have
risen signiﬁcantly. The government may take intervention measures such as restricting the price differential ratio or proﬁt
ratio, prescribing restricted prices, or instituting a price rise submission system and price adjustment record system with
respect to speciﬁc aspects of prices. The importance of the real estate industry is beyond question and it is also undoubtedly
within the scope of intervention. When house prices rise too fast and cause broad public concern, or even threaten macro-
economic stability, the government can take necessary measures to manage the real estate industry.
After the real estate market stagnated between 1994 and 1997, China carried out a series of policies between 1998 and
2002 to support and encourage the growth of the real estate industry. After 2001, the real estate industry in China gradually
entered a trend of rapid growth, which soon resulted in overinvestment, soaring real estate prices, an irrational structure of
housing demand and supply, market disorder and other problems. In 2003, real estate investment in China increased by
30.33% compared to the previous year, which was the highest rate of growth since the last macroeconomic controls. In
the ﬁrst quarter of 2004, ﬁxed asset investment nationwide increased 15.2–43% on a quarter to quarter basis. In 2004,
the price of condominiums increased by 15.02% and the price of commercial and residential buildings rose by 15.99%. In
the same year, house prices rose much faster than in past years, where the growth rates had been between 3% and 5%. In
2005, the prices for condominiums increased by 16.72%. In early 2006, house prices soared in Shenzhen, Beijing, Guangzhou
and other cities, which was difﬁcult for low-income people to bear. Accordingly, the sharp rise in house prices eventually
became a social problem.
With the ongoing increase in house prices and enthusiasm for investing in the real estate industry, the government began
to implement a number of macroeconomic policies in 2003, which lasted until 2007. The policies included: (1) credit poli-
cies, such as increasing the required percentage of capital investment in real estate projects, strengthening the risk manage-
ment of real estate loans, increasing the interest rates on bank savings and loans, and increasing the initial deposit required
on second homes; (2) restrictions on foreign capital, such as the policy promulgating ‘‘Opinions on Regulating the Entry of
Foreign Investment into the Real Property Market and the Administration’’ and the reform of regulations covering real estate
in the ‘‘Catalogue for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment Industries’’1; (3) tax policies, such as imposing income tax on
the sale of second homes, collecting value-added land taxes and strengthening the management of lodging business tax returns;
and (4) reforming the policy on land transfer, such as strengthening the control of the supply of realty development land, imple-
menting strict regulations to protect cultivated land and adopting strict measures for the examination and approval of the sale
of all kinds of non-agricultural land.
Thesemacroeconomic controls had a long-term impact and deeply affected the real estate industry. The policieswere based
on thehigh prices of housing and the hugeproﬁts being earnedby real estate companies. Therefore, the data on real estate com-
panies’ net proﬁts play an important and sensitive role in our analysis. Because the restrictive policywas instituted by the gov-
ernment, real estate companies have an incentive to decrease their reported company proﬁts to avoid political costs.2.3. Hypotheses
Whether government regulation can inﬂuence the behavior of listed real estate companies and whether listed real estate
companies manage their earnings because of political costs, depends on the government’s motivation and ability to deter
and restrict the operations of real estate companies.
First, in terms of motivation, stability has important additional implications for emerging and transitional countries. Fluc-
tuations in the economic and political environment can cause great damage to the development of an emerging country.
Thus, in emerging and transitional countries, industries that have a close relationship with ordinary people, have excessive
proﬁts or are vulnerable to public opinion are more likely to face strict regulations. For the real estate industry, if prices rise1 The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and Ministry of Commerce issued the law ‘‘Catalogue for the Encouragement of Foreign
Investment Industries (Version 2007)’’ on December 2007. Compared with the 2004 version, the 2007 version made three main revisions in regard to the real
estate industry: (1) deleted ‘‘ordinary housing development construction’’ from the catalogue of encouraged investments; (2) added ‘‘real estate secondary
market transactions and real estate intermediary companies’’ into the regulated catalogue; and (3) deleted ‘‘large scale theme park construction and
management’’ from the regulated catalogue.
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leading to social conﬂict. In this case, the government may issue stricter regulations. After 2003, real estate prices rose so
rapidly nationwide that universal complaints were heard from all parts of the country. The complaints were voiced at all
levels of public opinion, thereby placing the government under tremendous pressure. To solve this problem, the government
made it a priority to regulate the growth of house prices at a reasonable rate. Furthermore, excessive expansion of the real
estate industry leads to the abnormal development of upstream and downstream industries, such as energy, raw materials
and construction, and therefore creates a hidden danger for national industries undergoing a structural adjustment. Accord-
ingly, strict regulation of the real estate industry was imperative.
Second, in terms of capacity, China’s economic transformation has been carried out in typical government-driven style
(Zhu and Dong, 2005). Formulating industry policies is an integral part of this economic growth model. New policy goals
can be achieved faster by using coercive power to carry out industrial regulations. The companies that are in accordance with
the national industrial policies will be supported at every level, such as through IPOs, SEOs, bank loans or even tax prefer-
ences. Companies that do not meet the industrial policies will be subject to more constraints from government. For example,
between 2003 and 2007, the real estate industry was subject to higher lending rates, incremental taxes on land value and
strict control of approval for non-agricultural land use. Therefore, in terms of capacity, the government is able to affect real
estate companies’ levels of risk, costs and proﬁts by using policy controls.
Generally speaking, the government is capable of effectively implementing policy controls in relation to motivation and
capacity. These regulations may indeed affect the behavior of real estate companies. The aim of the macroeconomic policies
introduced during 2003–2007 was to stabilize housing prices, decrease real estate industry proﬁts and promote the rational
allocation of resources. Real estate companies have incentives to manage their earnings to avoid further regulatory policies
and allay suspicions of excessive proﬁt making. Moreover, real estate companies are more likely to decrease their earnings to
remove suspicion of excessive proﬁts when house prices are rapidly increasing. In summary, we predict that:
Hypothesis 1. Listed real estate companies are more likely to decrease earnings when there are greater political costs.
Furthermore, according to the theory of ultimate property rights, listed enterprises can be classed as either state-owned
or non-state-owned. The property rights of state-owned enterprises belong to the public. Because of their special relation-
ship with the government, state-owned listed enterprises gain more protection from the government. Moreover, generating
proﬁt is not the only goal of state-owned enterprises. State-owned enterprises also undertake various social responsibilities,
such as maintaining social stability and providing employment. Therefore, there are signiﬁcant differences between state-
owned and non-state-owned companies. Early research showed that state-owned companies gain more ﬁnancial and polit-
ical support from the government than non-state-owned companies (Qian, 1994). This is because the government can also
gain a lot of resources to improve their political capital and promotional opportunities from the success of state-owned com-
panies (Li and Zhou, 2005). Furthermore, Brandt and Li (2003), Sun et al. (2006) and Lu et al. (2009) show that state banks are
inclined to give preferential treatment to state-owned companies. Therefore, if the government tightens its credit policy,
state-owned companies are expected to have greater access to loans from state banks than non-state-owned enterprises.
In other words, the actual effects of the control policies are expected to be different for state-owned and non-state-owned
companies, which results in different motivations for proﬁt management. In relation to this macroeconomic control policy,
because state-owned companies endure less political pressure than private companies, state-owned companies’ motivation
for proﬁt management is weaker than that of private companies. On the basis of the foregoing research we predict that:
Hypothesis 2. The potential for negative proﬁt management in non-state-owned listed real estate enterprises is greater than
that in state-owned listed real estate enterprises.
It must be noted that macroeconomic controls can also have some direct effects on corporate proﬁtability. For example,
the capital value of development projects and the increment tax on land value may increase. These policies can affect the
risks and costs faced by real estate companies and ultimately affect their business proﬁts. Encouraged by these policies, real
estate companies may earn more money or their proﬁts may be reduced. In addition, the macroeconomic control policies
may have no effect on a company’s proﬁt management.2 If a company does not take political costs into account, then negative
proﬁt management will not be necessary under these policies. This reminds us that the level of company proﬁts should be taken
into account in the following analysis.
3. Sample, variables and empirical results
3.1. Sample
The sample used in this study comprises all A-share real estate companies listed in China between 2002 and 2007, accord-
ing to the industry classiﬁcation system of the China Securities Regulatory Commission. Because there is an insufﬁcient2 However, it may inﬂuence discretionary accruals systematically by stock, etc.
Table 1
Sample selection process.
Year N Listed less than 1 year ST Value missing Sample
Panel A
2002 42 8 3 2 29
2003 52 8 6 1 37
2004 53 10 6 1 36
2005 56 8 4 1 43
2006 56 10 6 1 39
2007 68 12 7 1 48
Sum 327 56 32 7 232
Year All SOE Non-SOE
Panel B
2002–2003 66 45 21
2004–2007 166 105 61
Sum 232 150 82
This table gives the sample selection process in Panel A and shows the distribution of all enterprises as well as the distribution of SOEs and Non-SOEs in the
two periods of macroeconomic control in Panel B.
Fig. 1. The annual cumulative abnormal returns of listed real estate companies from 2002 to 2006. This ﬁgure shows the annual cumulative abnormal
returns of listed real estate companies from 2002 to 2006, which are signiﬁcant lower than zero during the retrenchment period (2004–2006).
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ulation of the real estate market in China, 2002–2003 can be deﬁned as an incentive period and 2004–2007 can be deﬁned as
a retrenchment period. Accordingly, we deﬁne 2007 as our ﬁnishing point.3 Further selection of the data from the CSMAR
database was conducted on the basis of the following points: (1) to avoid the IPO effect, companies listed for less than 1 year
were removed; (2) special treatment (ST) companies, speciﬁcally for the years during, before and after the ST, were removed (Lu,
1999); (3) missing ﬁnancial data was collecting manually and companies that still lacked ﬁnancial data after the manual col-
lection process were removed from the sample. Finally, we collected a total of 232 ﬁrm-year observations. The sample selection
process is depicted in Table 1, Panel A. Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution of all enterprises as well as the distribution of
state-owned and non-state-owned companies in the two periods of macroeconomic control.3.2. Event study
In this section, we investigate the impact of the real estate market control policies using event study methodology, before
discussing the descriptive statistics and presenting the regression analysis.
The annual cumulative abnormal returns of listed real estate companies from 2002 to 2006 are shown in Fig. 1.4 As can be
seen in Fig. 1, there is no clear trend in the cumulative abnormal returns of the real estate industry during the incentive period
(2002–2003). However, during the retrenchment period (2004–2006), the cumulative abnormal returns are signiﬁcantly lower
than zero.5 This suggests that the government’s real estate control policies may indeed have had a signiﬁcant impact. In par-
ticular, the control policies during the retrenchment period may have had an adverse effect on the value of listed real estate
companies.3 We also consider the lagged effects of policy implementation, as some tightening policies had in fact been introduced as early as April 2003.
4 Because real estate companies generated huge returns in 2007, Fig. 1 ends at 2006. If the window ended at 2007, the prior ﬂuctuations would not be
obvious. The cumulative abnormal returns (BHAR) are calculated as follows: BHARt ¼ 1N
PN
i¼1P
t
t¼1ð1þ Returni;t Ptt¼1ð1þ ReturnMtÞ Returni is monthly
accumulated returns of each stock, ReturnM is monthly accumulated returns of the capital market, N is the number of stocks, and t is the observation time.
5 The cumulative abnormal returns after the middle of 2006 are positive at which point the market changes into a bull market. There may be some
correlation between these two periods.
Fig. 2. The cumulative abnormal returns around ‘Action Six’. This ﬁgure shows the cumulative abnormal returns of listed real estate companies around
‘Action Six’, which seems to have a negative effect on the market value of listed real estate companies.
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‘‘Guidance on the adjustment of housing supply structure and stabilizing housing prices’’ (SCS (2006) 37, called ‘‘Action
Fifteen’’ by the nine government ministries). This document supplemented the earlier ‘‘Action Six’’ in limiting dwelling size
and the percentage of small units, and increasing the down payment on a ﬁrst house. Speciﬁcally, houses smaller than 90
square meters were required to occupy at least 70% of the total construction area and at least 70% of new residential land
should be used to construct affordable housing.
Why have we chosen to study this event? The main reason is that this policy had a direct impact on the future scale and
standards of housing construction. It also changed people’s housing needs and the supply structure of real estate companies,
increasing the risks and uncertainties faced by real estate enterprises. Furthermore, as the policy makes clear reference to
future housing control policies, it indicates that any subsequent regulations will be substantial. Therefore, we predict that
the market will interpret this news as a negative event for listed real estate companies and that we will ﬁnd negative cumu-
lative returns.6
The results shown in Fig. 2 are consistent with our expectations. The ﬁgure indicates that the government’s macroeco-
nomic control policy had a negative effect on the market value of listed real estate companies.
3.3. Variable deﬁnitions
3.3.1. Dependent variables
To test our hypotheses, we use discretionary accruals (DA) as the dependent variable. Dechow et al. (1995) and Xia (2003)
test earnings management measurement models in the United States and China, respectively. Their results indicate that the
modiﬁed Jones model (Jones, 1991) provides a good estimation of corporate earnings management. Therefore, we follow
their methodology to calculate discretionary accruals. Eq. (a):6 Not
of the cTAit=Ait1 ¼ ai½1=Ait1 þ b1i½DREVit=Ait1  DRECit=Ait1 þ b2i½PPEit=Ait1 þ nit ðaÞ
where TAit is total accruals of company i in year t, which equals net proﬁt minus net operating cash ﬂow; DREVit is the yearly
change in operating income of company i in year t; PPEit is ﬁxed assets of property, plant and equipment of company i in year
t; Ait1 is the previous year’s total assets of company i; and DRECit is the change in the receivables of company i in year t.
Each company’s non-discretionary accruals are calculated using Eq. (b):NDAit=Ait1 ¼ ai½1=Ait1 þ b1i½DREVit=Ait1  DRECit=Ait1 þ b2i½PPEit=Ait1 ðbÞ
Each company’s discretionary accruals are calculated by Eq. (c):DAit ¼ TAit  NDAit ðcÞ3.3.2. Independent variables
In this section, we focus on ﬁnding an appropriate proxy for political costs. We consider this issue from multiple view-
points and by integrating the theoretical analysis presented in earlier sections of this paper. First, following previous re-
search (Cahan et al., 1997; Key, 1997), we use the two periods of macroeconomic control of the real estate industry as
the basis for the dummy variable GROUP. GROUP is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the year is between 2004 and 2007,
and 0 otherwise. If companies are more sensitive to political costs during tightening years, GROUP will be signiﬁcantly neg-
ative. Second, if the real estate industry is booming, the government may introduce regulations that focus on house prices,
which are directly related to real estate companies’ proﬁts. Therefore, real estate companies may be more likely to decrease
their earnings when real estate prices are rapidly increasing. As a result, we select the national average growth rate of housees: CARt ¼ 1N
PN
i¼1
Pt
t¼1YReturni;t  ReturnMtY. Returni is the monthly accumulated returns of each stock, ReturnM is the monthly accumulated returns
apital market, N is the number of stocks, and t is the observation time.
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purchasing power of residents, the average growth in house prices divided by the increase in the average worker’s wage (RA-
TIO), as another alternative measure.
3.3.3. Control variables
Based on previous research, we control for the following variables:
Company type (SOE) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if company is a state-owned listed company, and 0 otherwise.
Company size (SIZE) is the natural logarithm of a company’s total ﬁscal year assets. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) pointed
out that, with respect to antitrust legislation, large companies are more likely to manage earnings to avoid regulation. Many
Western scholars have since used size as a proxy for political costs. However, in the institutional context of China, the gov-
ernment does not impose regulations on large enterprises because of their monopoly situation and, on the contrary, encour-
ages enterprises to become ‘‘become bigger and stronger’’. In addition, Wang (2000) and Qiao et al. (2005) agree that size is
not suitable as a measure of political costs in research on China. Nevertheless, to ensure our ﬁndings are comparable with
previous studies, we still take ﬁrm size (SIZE) into account in this paper.
We use ROA (return on total assets) as a measure for corporate operating conditions. A company’s choice of accounting
policy may be affected by its current economic condition. Companies in good operating and ﬁnancial condition are more
willing to adopt accounting policies that can reduce current earnings or smooth earnings. Dechow et al. (1995) found that
it is necessary to control for ROA, which is a variable for operating conditions, when the manipulation of accruals is associ-
ated with company performance. Lei and Liu (2006) also found that company earnings management is positively related to
ROA in China.
Asset liability ratio (LEV). Under uniform conditions, companies that face the risk of violating their debt contracts are
more likely to choose accounting procedures that can shift future earnings to the current period to avoid default costs. Stud-
ies have found that the asset-liability ratio is positively associated with earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995, 1996;
Bartov et al., 2000). This shows that, to avoid violating their debt contracts, companies will carry out aggressive accounting
policies.
Accruals during the previous period (L_TA). Previous research has shown that accrual reversals do actually occur (Dechow
et al., 1995; Sloan, 1996). The higher the accruals during the previous period, the less possible it is for managers to introduce
accounting policies capable of increasing current earnings.
Change of board chairman (CHANGE), is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the chairman of the board changes, and 0 other-
wise. A change of manager can bring changes to a company’s production plan and investment and ﬁnancing strategies. These
changes can depreciate the original value of assets. To better fulﬁll a company’s future proﬁtability goals, a new manager
maymanage earnings to shift responsibility to the previous manager. Warner andWruck (1988) found that a change of man-
ager is negatively related to corporate performance in the United States. In addition, Zhu (2002) found that a change of chair-
man is associated with earnings management in China.
Largest shareholder (TOP). Whether in developed or developing countries, once in a position of majority control, the larg-
est shareholder may accrue private beneﬁts through certain channels within the corporation, such as payments of special
dividends and connected transactions. These practices can lead to the exploitation of minority shareholders (Claessens
et al., 2000). Li and Guan (2004) found that in the case of extreme shareholder concentration, large shareholders have incen-
tives to supervise managers and to become actively involved in corporate governance. However, once they gain complete
control of the company, largest shareholders often exploit the interests of minority shareholders by decreasing the quality
of accounting information.
The main variables and their deﬁnitions are shown in Table 2.Table 2
The variables.
Variables Name Symbols Deﬁnitions
Dependent variables Handling accruals DA Calculated by Jones model
Independent variables Year groups GROUP Equals 1 if year is between 2004–2007; and 0 otherwise
National average growth rate of house
prices
GROWTH National average growth rate of house prices
Average house price growth divided by
growth rate of the average worker’s wage
RATIO Average house price growth divided by growth rate of the
average worker’s wage
Control variables Company’s nature SOE Equals 1 if company is a state-owned listed company, 0
otherwise
Company size SIZE Equals natural logarithm of total ﬁscal year assets
Return on total assets ROA Return on total assets
Asset liability ratio LEV Total liabilities divided by total assets
Accruals of previous period L_TA Accruals of previous period divided by assets of previous year
Change of board chairman CHANGE Equals 1 if chairman of the board changes, 0 otherwise
Largest proportion of shareholding TOP Largest proportion of shareholding
This table describes the variables collected for the 232 sample in our study. The ﬁrst column gives the types of the variable, the second column gives the
name of the variables, the third column gives the symbols of the variable and the last column gives the deﬁnitions of the variables.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of the main variables.
Variables N Mean Lower quartile Medium Upper quartile Standard deviation
GROUP 232 0.7155 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4521
GROWTH 232 0.1070 0.0484 0.1404 0.1476 0.0531
RATIO 232 0.7014 0.3719 0.7886 0.9614 0.3408
SOE 232 0.6466 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4791
SIZE 232 21.7153 21.0406 21.7601 22.2994 0.9656
ROA 232 0.0292 0.0118 0.0308 0.0492 0.0392
LEV 232 0.5634 0.4667 0.5825 0.6801 0.1577
L_TA 232 0.0341 0.0471 0.0262 0.1063 0.1548
CHANGE 232 0.2974 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4581
TOP 232 0.3801 0.2592 0.3326 0.5052 0.1700
This table lists the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this paper.
Table 4
DA in different groups.
Variable Year group N Mean Medium T value Z value
Panel A
DA 2002–2003 66 0.0391 0.0078 0.13 0.17
2004–2007 166 0.0357 0.0276
Panel B
SOEs 2002–2003 45 0.0416 0.0142 0.87 1.41
2004–2007 105 0.0705 0.0453
Non-SOEs 2002–2003 21 0.0338 0.0082 1.48 1.51
2004–2007 61 0.0242 0.0201
Variable Year group Nature N Mean Medium T value Z value
Panel C
DA > 0 2002–2003 SOEs 22 0.1723 0.1287 1.00 0.85
Non-SOEs 12 0.1109 0.0745
2004–2007 SOEs 65 0.1694 0.1070 1.05 1.27
Non-SOEs 27 0.1327 0.0872
DA < 0 2002–2003 SOEs 23 0.0834 0.0634 0.48 1.01
Non-SOEs 9 0.0690 0.0563
2004–2007 SOEs 40 0.0902 0.0677 2.33⁄⁄ 2.53⁄⁄
Non-SOEs 34 0.1488 0.1242
Note: ⁄⁄⁄,⁄⁄,⁄ Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Panel A shows that there is no signiﬁcant difference in DA between the 2002-2003 and 2004-2007 groups. Panel B shows that the mean and median DA of
non-state-owned companies in 2004-2007 is lower than that of 2002-2003, but the difference is not signiﬁcant. Panel C shows that in the group in which DA
are negative in 2004-2007, the DA of Non-SOEs is less than those of SOEs.
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Table 3 lists the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this paper. Table 3 shows that the mean (median) of
GROWTH is 0.1070 (0.1404), indicating that China’s housing market has experienced a high rate of growth in recent years. In
this case, the government is likely to impose regulations on listed real estate companies. Table 3 also shows that the mean
(median) of RATIO is 0.7014 (0.7886), which means that 70% of the growth in wages was offset by increases in housing prices.
Next, we compare discretionary accruals (DA) for different years and for different types (state-owned and non-state-
owned) of listed real estate companies. Table 4 Panel A shows that there is no signiﬁcant difference in DA between the
2002–2003 and 2004–2007 groups. Table 4 Panel B shows that the mean and median DA of non-state-owned companies
in 2004–2007 is lower than that of 2002–2003, but the difference is not signiﬁcant. Furthermore, the observations were di-
vided into two groups according to whether DA is positive or negative. Table 4 Panel C shows that in the group in which DA
are negative in 2004–2007, the DA of non-state-owned real estate companies is less than those of state-owned real estate
companies. The mean (median) DA is 0.0902 (0.0677) in the state-owned group, and 0.1488 (0.1242) in the non-
state-owned group. Both mean and median tests are signiﬁcant.3.5. Regression analysis
3.5.1. Political costs and earnings management
To test Hypothesis 1: listed real estate companies are more likely to decrease earnings when there are greater political
costs, we build Model (1) based on Bo and Wu (2009). POLI is the variable for political costs, speciﬁcally measured by the
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This tabDA ¼ b0 þ b1POLI þ b2SIZEþ b3ROAþ b4LEV þ b5L TAþ b6CHANGEþ b7TOP þ e ð1Þtions.
DA GROUP GROWTH RATIO SIZE ROA LEV L_TA CHANGE TOP
1 0.0113 0.0140 0.0282 0.3260 0.2696 0.1071 0.2513 0.0706 0.0158
0.8644 0.8322 0.6692 <.0001 <.0001 0.1036 0.0001 0.2842 0.8107
UP 0.0083 1 0.7933 0.7932 0.1608 0.1026 0.0474 0.0127 0.0287 0.1171
0.9002 <.0001 <.0001 0.0142 0.1192 0.4728 0.8475 0.6642 0.0752
WTH 0.0519 0.7570 1 0.9068 0.1250 0.1297 0.0482 0.0715 0.0707 0.0351
0.4317 <.0001 <.0001 0.0573 0.0485 0.4653 0.2782 0.2837 0.5944
O 0.0697 0.7043 0.9627 1 0.0579 0.0661 0.0581 0.0241 0.1119 0.0230
0.2908 <.0001 <.0001 0.3803 0.3161 0.3782 0.7147 0.0890 0.7278
0.3808 0.1647 0.0986 0.0426 1 0.2653 0.1233 0.1645 0.1261 0.0556
<.0001 0.0120 0.1342 0.5186 <.0001 0.0608 0.0121 0.0551 0.3993
0.2373 0.0775 0.0645 0.0257 0.1865 1 0.2596 0.1365 0.1565 0.0063
0.0003 0.2399 0.3283 0.6973 0.0044 <.0001 0.0378 0.0171 0.9235
0.1190 0.0480 0.0339 0.0487 0.1433 0.2934 1 0.1296 0.0032 0.0778
0.0705 0.4667 0.6071 0.4608 0.0292 <.0001 0.0487 0.9617 0.2376
0.2550 0.0328 0.0478 0.0400 0.1965 0.1565 0.1337 1 0.1274 0.0523
<.0001 0.6196 0.4687 0.5443 0.0026 0.0171 0.0419 0.0527 0.4279
NGE 0.0770 0.0287 0.0847 0.1178 0.0992 0.1096 0.0302 0.0922 1 0.0179
0.2430 0.6642 0.1984 0.0733 0.1318 0.0958 0.6476 0.1615 0.7865
0.0008 0.1091 0.0241 0.0111 0.0126 0.0384 0.0922 0.0288 0.0024 1
0.9899 0.0974 0.7150 0.8664 0.8487 0.5610 0.1615 0.6622 0.9710
le provides the correlation matrix of the main variables, comprising Pearson correlation coefﬁcients in the lower triangular matrix and Spearmen
tion coefﬁcients in the upper triangular matrix.
tion between DA and political costs in pooled samples.
able Symbol GROUP
Coefﬁcient T value
l A
cept CONS 1.3586⁄⁄⁄ 5.24
ical costs POLI 0.0316 1.26
pany size SIZE 0.0603⁄⁄⁄ 4.93
rn on total assets ROA 0.9346⁄⁄⁄ 3.00
t liability ratio LEV 0.1372⁄ 1.79
uals of previous period L_TA 0.1746⁄⁄ 2.33
ge of board chairman CHANGE 0.0041 0.17
est proportion of shareholding TOP 0.0045 0.07
2 0.1923
ue 8.86
232
able Symbol GROWTH RATIO
Coefﬁcient T value Coefﬁcient T value
l B
cept CONS 1.3250⁄⁄⁄ 5.15 1.3006⁄⁄⁄ 5.04
ical costs POLI 0.3781⁄ 1.80 0.0558⁄ 1.71
pany size SIZE 0.0595⁄⁄⁄ 4.93 0.0583⁄⁄⁄ 4.84
rn on total assets ROA 0.9320⁄⁄⁄ 3.01 0.9163⁄⁄⁄ 2.96
t liability ratio LEV 0.1368⁄ 1.79 0.1383⁄ 1.81
uals of previous period L_TA 0.1845⁄⁄ 2.48 0.1847⁄⁄ 2.48
ge of board chairman CHANGE 0.0068 0.28 0.0084 0.34
est proportion of shareholding TOP 0.0021 0.03 0.0040 0.06
2 0.1983 0.1971
ue 9.16 9.10
232 232
⁄,⁄⁄,⁄ indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
le shows the regression results of model 1, which is to test the relation between DA and political costs in the pooled samples.
Table 7
The relation between DA and political costs in SOEs group and non-SOEs group.
Variable Symbol SOEs Non-SOEs
Coefﬁcient T value Coefﬁcient T value
Panel A
Intercept CONS 1.1052⁄⁄⁄ 3.20 1.3894⁄⁄⁄ 2.65
Year group GROUP 0.0130 0.42 0.0962⁄⁄ 2.17
Company size SIZE 0.0488⁄⁄⁄ 3.09 0.0664⁄⁄ 2.61
Return on total assets ROA 0.8934⁄⁄ 1.98 1.0134⁄⁄ 2.31
Asset liability ratio LEV 0.1429 1.49 0.0060 0.04
Accruals of previous period L_TA 0.3294⁄⁄⁄ 3.20 0.0435 0.39
Change of board chairman CHANGE 0.0140 0.45 0.0565 1.34
Largest proportion of shareholding TOP 0.0526 0.66 0.1178 0.82
Adj R2 0.1821 0.1815
F value 5.74 3.57
N 150 82
Panel B
Intercept CONS 1.0857⁄⁄⁄ 3.17 1.1361⁄⁄ 2.24
National average growth rate of house prices GROWTH 0.0281 0.11 1.1978⁄⁄⁄ 3.43
Company size SIZE 0.0477⁄⁄⁄ 3.05 0.0564⁄⁄ 2.32
Return on total assets ROA 0.8942⁄⁄ 1.98 1.0375⁄⁄ 2.48
Asset liability ratio LEV 0.1400 1.47 0.0074 0.06
Accruals of previous period L_TA 0.3294⁄⁄⁄ 3.19 0.0018 0.02
Change of board chairman CHANGE 0.0137 0.44 0.0648 1.60
Largest proportion of shareholding TOP 0.0503 0.63 0.1492 1.08
Adj R2 0.18 0.25
F value 5.71 4.83
N 150 82
Panel C
Intercept CONS 1.0836⁄⁄⁄ 3.17 1.0501⁄⁄ 2.02
Average house price growth divided by growth rate of the average worker’s wage RATIO 0.0095 0.24 0.1751⁄⁄⁄ 3.10
Company size SIZE 0.0477⁄⁄⁄ 3.08 0.0516⁄⁄ 2.08
Return on total assets ROA 0.8922⁄⁄ 1.98 0.9751⁄⁄ 2.31
Asset liability ratio LEV 0.1404 1.47 0.0347 0.27
Accruals of previous period L_TA 0.3303⁄⁄⁄ 3.20 0.0031 0.03
Change of board chairman CHANGE 0.0132 0.43 0.0694⁄ 1.68
Largest proportion of shareholding TOP 0.0500 0.63 0.1414 1.01
Adj R2 0.18 0.23
F value 5.72 4.45
N 150 82
Note: ⁄⁄⁄,⁄⁄ indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels.
This table shows the relation between DA and political costs in SOEs group and Non-SOEs group.
Table 8
Test using interaction variable method.
Variable Symbol GROUP GROWTH RATIO
Intercept CONS 1.2227⁄⁄⁄ 1.1070⁄⁄⁄ 1.0873⁄⁄⁄
Political costs POLI 0.0673 1.0892⁄⁄⁄ 0.1589⁄⁄⁄
Company’s nature SOE 0.0179 0.0910⁄ 0.0790
Company’s nature  political costs SOEPOLI 0.0567 1.0738⁄⁄ 0.1508⁄⁄
Company size SIZE 0.0549⁄⁄⁄ 0.0525⁄⁄⁄ 0.0512⁄⁄⁄
Return on total assets ROA 0.9694⁄⁄⁄ 0.9892⁄⁄⁄ 0.9469⁄⁄⁄
Asset liability ratio LEV 0.1360⁄ 0.1378⁄ 0.1457⁄
Accruals of previous period L_TA 0.1659⁄⁄ 0.1773⁄⁄ 0.1768⁄⁄
Change of board chairman CHANGE 0.0066 0.0095 0.0121
Largest proportion of shareholding TOP 0.0172 0.0113 0.0138
Adj R2 0.19 0.21 0.21
F value 7.10 8.02 7.82
N 232 232 232
Note: ⁄⁄⁄,⁄⁄,⁄ indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
This table shows the regression results of model 2 using interaction variable SOE ⁄POLI to test the difference of political costs between SOEs and Non-SOEs.
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Table 9
Analysis of central government enterprises.
Variable Symbol GROUP GROWTH RATIO
Intercept CONS 1.0285⁄⁄⁄ 1.0444⁄⁄⁄ 1.0463⁄⁄⁄
Political costs POLI 0.0169 0.0189 0.0055
Companies’ nature CEN 0.0211 0.0918 0.1438
Companies’ nature  political costs CENPOLI 0.0402 0.3609 0.1281
Company size SIZE 0.0451⁄⁄⁄ 0.0452⁄⁄⁄ 0.0453⁄⁄⁄
Return on total assets ROA 0.7976⁄ 0.7729⁄ 0.7572
Asset liability ratio LEV 0.1395 0.1316 0.1305
Accruals of previous period L_TA 0.3188⁄⁄⁄ 0.3278⁄⁄⁄ 0.3313⁄⁄⁄
Change of board chairman CHANGE 0.0089 0.0082 0.0057
Largest proportion of shareholding TOP 0.036 0.0255 0.0247
Adj R2 0.18 0.18 0.18
F value 4.63 4.62 4.76
N 150 150 150
Note: ⁄⁄⁄,⁄ indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 10% levels.
This table shows the regression results to test the difference of political costs between ordinary SOEs and central government enterprises. CEN is a dummy
variable, which equals 1 if the ﬁrm is a central government enterprise, and 0 otherwise.
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triangular matrix and Spearmen correlation coefﬁcients in the upper triangular matrix. Table 5 shows that DA is negatively
correlated with political costs and positively correlated with SIZE. This conﬁrms that SIZE is not an appropriate variable for
political costs in China. As the correlation matrix also shows, DA has a stronger relationship with ROA, LEV, L_TA and other
variables.
The regression results of Model 1 are displayed in Table 6. Table 6 Panel A shows that the coefﬁcient on GROUP is negative,
but not signiﬁcant. Table 6 Panel B shows that DA is signiﬁcantly negatively related to GROWTH and RATIO. These results are
consistent with our hypothesis, that the faster house prices grow, the more likely companies will manage earnings.
3.5.2. State-owned versus non-state-owned companies
We also compare the political costs of state-owned versus non-state-owned companies to test Hypothesis 2.
Table 7 shows the regression results. Table 7 Panel A shows that the coefﬁcient on GROUP is negative in the state-owned
group, but not signiﬁcant. However, the coefﬁcient on GROUP is signiﬁcantly negative in the non-state-owned group, at the
level of 5%. This shows that non-state-owned real estate companies had a stronger motivation to decrease their current earn-
ings in the 2004–2007 period compared with the 2002–2003 period. However, this difference is not found in state-owned
real estate listed companies.
Table 7 Panel B and Panel C show that the coefﬁcients on GROWTH and RATIO are not signiﬁcant in the state-owned group.
However, in the non-state-owned group, the coefﬁcient on GROWTH is 1.1978 and the coefﬁcient on RATIO is 0.1751, both
are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This suggests that, when house prices are used as a reference for political costs, non-state-
owned companies are more sensitive to government regulation compared to state-owned enterprises. As political pressure
increases, non-state-owned listed companies have a stronger motivation to decrease their current earnings. As state-owned
real estate companies are able to get more implicit beneﬁts from the government, such as more bank loans, they are not so
sensitive to political costs.
To show our results are robust to different speciﬁcations, we use an additional model with interaction terms on the
full sample. According to Hypothesis 2, the interaction term SOEPOLI should be signiﬁcantly positive. Model (2) is as
follows:DA ¼ b0 þ b1POLI þ b2SOEþ b3SOE  POLI þ b4SIZEþ b5ROAþ b6LEV þ b7L TAþ b8CHANGEþ b9TOP þ e ð2ÞTable 8 shows the regression results. The coefﬁcients on SOEGROWTH and SOERATIO are both positive and signiﬁcant at
the 5% level, while the coefﬁcient on SOEGROUP is positive but not signiﬁcant. These results conﬁrm that non-state-owned
enterprises are more sensitive to political costs than state-owned enterprises.
3.5.3. Analysis of central government enterprises
If non-state-owned enterprises are relatively more sensitive to political costs than state-owned enterprises, then it
should also be the case that ordinary state-owned enterprises are more sensitive to political costs than central govern-
ment enterprises. Therefore, we segregate our sample of state-owned enterprises by adding a dummy variable CEN, which
equals 1 if the ﬁrm is a central government enterprise, and 0 otherwise to test our hypothesis. If ordinary state-owned
enterprises are more sensitive to political costs than central government enterprises, then CENPOLI should be signiﬁ-
cantly positive.
Table 9 shows these regression results. However, the coefﬁcients on CENPOLI are not signiﬁcant, which means that or-
dinary state-owned enterprises are no more sensitive to political costs than central government enterprises.
Table 10
Robustness test on deposits.
Variable Symbol SOEs Non-SOEs
Coefﬁcient T value Coefﬁcient T value
Panel A
Intercept CONS 13.4479⁄⁄⁄ 5.31 19.3200⁄⁄⁄ 3.28
Year group GROUP 0.4744⁄⁄ 2.08 1.4918⁄⁄⁄ 3.07
Company size SIZE 1.4299⁄⁄⁄ 12.40 1.5531⁄⁄⁄ 5.48
Return on total assets ROA 2.5751 0.78 8.1250⁄ 1.68
Asset liability ratio LEV 2.8971⁄⁄⁄ 4.11 5.4331⁄⁄⁄ 3.63
Accruals of previous period L_TA 1.3533⁄ 1.81 0.0098 0.01
Change of board chairman CHANGE 0.0015 0.01 0.7896⁄ 1.71
Largest proportion of shareholding TOP 0.5369 0.92 0.6835 0.44
Adj R2 0.58 0.43
F value 30.43 9.76
N 148 81
Panel B
Intercept CONS 12.8344⁄⁄⁄ 5.04 21.4755⁄⁄⁄ 3.52
National average growth rate of house prices GROWTH 1.6310 0.85 8.8298⁄⁄ 2.15
Company size SIZE 1.3952⁄⁄⁄ 12.09 1.6759⁄⁄⁄ 5.77
Return on total assets ROA 2.6087 0.79 9.3873⁄ 1.90
Asset liability ratio LEV 2.8159⁄⁄⁄ 3.95 5.0865⁄⁄⁄ 3.31
Accruals of previous period L_TA 1.3427⁄ 1.77 0.8164 0.67
Change of board chairman CHANGE 0.0194 0.08 0.7638 1.6
Largest proportion of shareholding TOP 0.4463 0.75 1.0199 0.63
Adj R2 0.57 0.40
F value 29.17 8.58
N 148 81
Panel C
Intercept CONS 12.7059⁄⁄⁄ 5.00 22.4959⁄⁄⁄ 3.68
Average house price growth divided by growth rate of the average worker’s wage RATIO 0.2220 0.76 1.5482⁄⁄ 2.37
Company size SIZE 1.3886⁄⁄⁄ 12.10 1.7221⁄⁄⁄ 5.94
Return on total assets ROA 2.5809 0.78 9.6211⁄ 1.97
Asset liability ratio LEV 2.8132⁄⁄⁄ 3.95 4.8591⁄⁄⁄ 3.19
Accruals of previous period L_TA 1.3432⁄ 1.76 0.8074 0.67
Change of board chairman CHANGE 0.0228 0.10 0.8343⁄ 1.74
Largest proportion of shareholding TOP 0.4406 0.74 0.9804 0.61
Adj R2 0.57 0.41
F value 29.12 8.83
N 148 81
Note: ⁄⁄⁄,⁄⁄,⁄ indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
This table shows the regression results of model 3, which is to test the relation between deposits and political costs in SOEs group and Non-SOEs group.
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The magnitude of earnings management is an important issue to be explained in our paper. However, whether DA
as calculated by the Jones model is applicable in this study is questionable for the following reasons. First, the Jones
model has more explanatory power in relation to earnings management if there are a large number of sample years.
However, as China’s securities market has been in existence for less than 20 years, we do not have a long enough
time-series sample of large-scale real estate companies. Second, real estate companies often have huge amounts of ac-
crued proﬁts and it is easier for them to manipulate proﬁts through deposits received. Therefore, it is insufﬁcient to
only examine DA.
We therefore also investigate the deposits received by listed real estate companies. Real estate companies can manipulate
earnings by reorganizing sales (e.g., conﬁrming sales as deposits received). We build Model (3) using (REP) as the dependent
variable based on deposits received. REP is the natural logarithm of deposits received:REP ¼ b0 þ b1POLI þ b2SIZEþ b3ROAþ b4LEV þ b5L TAþ b6CHANGEþ b7TOP þ e ð3ÞWe divide the sample based on company type (state and non-state). The results are shown in Table 10. Panel A shows that
the coefﬁcient on GROUP in the case of state-owned companies is signiﬁcantly negative at the 5% level, after controlling
for ROA. The coefﬁcient on GROUP is signiﬁcantly negative (1.4918) at the 1% signiﬁcance level, for non-state-owned
companies. This means that in policy tightening years, non-state-owned real estate companies are more willing to recognize
sales as deposits received to defer revenue recognition. However, the results are in contrast to those for state-owned real
estate companies.
Table 11
Deposits test using interaction variable method.
Variable Symbol GROUP GROWTH RATIO
Intercept CONS 16.1524⁄⁄⁄ 15.8844⁄⁄⁄ 16.0880⁄⁄⁄
Political costs POLI 1.3660⁄⁄⁄ 8.3729⁄⁄ 1.4158⁄⁄⁄
Companies’ nature SOE 1.3150⁄⁄⁄ 1.0345⁄⁄ 1.0767⁄⁄
Companies’ nature  political costs SOEPOLI 1.8851⁄⁄⁄ 10.2081⁄⁄ 1.6443⁄⁄⁄
Company size SIZE 1.4636⁄⁄⁄ 1.4592⁄⁄⁄ 1.4656⁄⁄⁄
Return on total assets ROA 5.6684⁄⁄ 6.3966⁄⁄ 6.6431⁄⁄
Asset liability ratio LEV 3.5721⁄⁄⁄ 3.4159⁄⁄⁄ 3.3401⁄⁄⁄
Accruals of previous period L_TA 0.7652 1.0566 1.0395
Change of board chairman CHANGE 0.2642 0.2504 0.2755
Largest proportion of shareholding TOP 0.2889 0.2439 0.2170
Adj R2 0.53 0.51 0.52
F value 29.98 27.78 27.93
N 229 229 229
Note: ⁄⁄⁄,⁄⁄ indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels.
This table shows the regression results of model 4 using interaction variable SOE ⁄POLI to test the difference between SOEs and Non-SOEs.
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panies, but are for non-state-owned companies. For non-state-owned enterprises, the coefﬁcients on GROWTH and RATIO are
positive and signiﬁcant (8.8298 and 1.5482) at the 5% level. This suggests that, when house prices are used as a reference for
national macroeconomic control policies, non-state-owned enterprises have a stronger motivation to hide proﬁts by recog-
nizing sales as deposits received compared to state-owned enterprises. This result conﬁrms that state-owned enterprises
face less pressure from political costs.
To reveal the connections more clearly, we use model (4) with interaction terms on the full sample. According to Hypoth-
esis 2, the coefﬁcient on SOEPOLI should be signiﬁcantly negative. Model (4) is as follows:7 We
assets d
but notREP ¼ b0 þ b1POLI þ b2SOEþ b3SOE  POLI þ b4SIZEþ b5ROAþ b6LEV þ b7L TAþ b8CHANGEþ b9TOP þ e ð4Þ
The regression results are shown in Table 11. The coefﬁcients on POLISOE are all negative. The coefﬁcients on SOEGROUP
and SOERATIO are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The coefﬁcient on SOEGROWTH is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.7 Consistent with
Table 10, these results show that non-state-owned enterprises are more sensitive to political costs than state-owned
enterprises.4. Conclusions, limitations and future research directions
Using a sample of listed real estate companies between 2002 and 2007, we conduct an empirical study of the political
costs hypothesis for earnings management in the context of China. The results show that, to avoid the negative impact of
tightening government policies, listed real estate companies have an incentive to decrease current earnings. The motivation
to conduct earnings management is greater for non-state-owned real estate companies than state-owned companies. How-
ever, we do not ﬁnd evidence that ordinary state-owned enterprises are more sensitive to political costs compared to central
government enterprises. The results of our study demonstrate that close attention needs to be paid to economic indicators
that act as references for macroeconomic controls when conducting earnings management research in the context of China.
Our ﬁrst contribution to the earnings management literature is that company size, commonly used as a proxy for political
costs in traditional Western research, does not apply in the context of China. Economic indicators that act as references to
macroeconomic controls may be more accurate. Second, we test for differences in political cost sensitivity in different types
of corporations, thereby enriching the approach to political costs research in China. Our ﬁndings provide a reference for gov-
ernment industrial policy during transition periods.
There are a number of limitations to this study. First, we created new variables as proxies for political costs that have
never been used in previous studies. We do not study the importance of real estate prices for government regulation or
how political costs are applied to the real estate industry. Further research is needed in this ﬁeld, for example, to examine
whether the ease of re-ﬁnancing and the level of tax incentives play important roles in earnings manipulation. Second, our
political cost indicator is limited to the macroeconomic level and we fail to identify the political costs of individual compa-
nies. In addition, as there are a variety of real estate price indexes, it may be questionable whether our indicator is the most
appropriate. These choices may all have an impact on the ﬁnal results. Third, our sample is limited to the real estate industry,
which weakens the generalizability of our conclusions. Nonetheless, these limitations all provide directions for future
research.also conducted a test using the following variables: (1) REP1 = deposit received/total revenue during the previous year; (2) REP2 = deposit received/total
uring the previous year; (3) REP3 = deposit received/total revenue; and (4) REP4 = deposit received/total assets. The interceptions are always negative,
always signiﬁcant.
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